Intelligence-Based
Warfare
WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE?
By Martin
LIBICKI
IBW occurs when intelligence is fed directly into operations
(notably, targeting and battle damage assessment), rather than used
as an input for overall command and control. In contrast to the
other forms of warfare discussed so far, IBW results directly in
the application of steel to target (rather than corrupted bytes).
As sensors grow more acute and reliable, as they proliferate in
type and number, and as they become capable of feeding fire-control
systems in real time and near-real time, the task of developing,
maintaining, and exploiting systems that sense the battlespace,
assess its composition, and send the results to shooters assumes
increasing importance for tomorrow's militaries.
Despite differences in cognitive methods and purpose, systems
that collect and disseminate information acquired from inanimate
systems can be attacked and confounded by methods that are
effective on C2 systems. Although the purposes of situational
awareness (an intelligence attribute) and battlespace visibility (a
targeting attribute) are different, the means by which each is
realized are converging.
Offensive IBW
Sharp increases in the ratio of power to price of information
technologies, in particular those concentrated on distributed
systems, suggest new architectures for gathering and distributing
information.
Platforms that host operator, sensor, and weapon together will
give way to distributed systems in which each element is separate
but linked electronically. The local-decision loops of industrial
age warfare (e.g., a tank gunner uses infrared [IR] sights to
detect a target and fire an accurate round) will yield to global
loops (e.g., a target is detected through a fusion of sensor
readings, the operator fires a remotely piloted missile to a
calculated location). Because networking permits the logging of all
readings and subsequent findings (some more correct than others),
it can generate lessons learned more efficiently than a system that
depends on voluntary human reporting.
Note 16
The evolution of IBW may be understood as a shift in what
intelligence is useful for. Traditionally, the commander uses
intelligence to gauge the disposition, location, and general
intentions of the other side. The object of intelligence is to
prevent surprise -- a known component of information warfare -- and
to permit the commander to shape battle plans. Good intelligence
allows coordination of operations; great intelligence allows
coherence, which is a higher level of synchrony. Note 17 The goals of intelligence are
met when battle is joined; when one side understands its tasks and
is prepared to carry them out while the other reels from confusion
and shock -- thus, situational awareness.
Today's information systems reveal far more than yesterday's
could, permitting a degree of knowledge about the battlespace that
accords with situational awareness. The side that can see the other
side's tank column coming can dispose itself more favorably for an
encounter. The side that can see each tank and pinpoint its
location to within the effective radius of an incoming warhead can
avoid engaging the other side directly but can fire munitions to a
known, continually updated set of points from stand-off distances.
This shift in intelligence from preparing a battlefield to
mastering a battlefield is reflected in newly formed reporting
chains for this kind of information. Although the direct reporting
chain to the national command authority will continue, new channels
to successively lower echelons (and, eventually, to the weapons
themselves) are being etched. An apparent loss in status perceived
by the intelligence apparatus (thus one resisted) is turning out to
offer a large gain in functionality.
Tomorrow's battlefield environment will feature a mixed
architecture of sensors at various levels of coverage and
resolution that collectively illuminate it thoroughly. In
order to lay out what may become a complex architecture, sensors
can be separated into four groups: (i) far stand-off sensors
(mostly space but also seismic and acoustic sensors); (ii)
near stand-off sensors (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs] with
multispectral, passive microwave, synthetic aperture radar [SAR],
and electronic intelligence [elint] capabilities, as well as
similarly equipped offshore buoys and surface-based radar);
(iii) in-place sensors (e.g., acoustic, gravimetric,
biochemical, ground-based optical); and (iv) weapons sensors
(e.g., IR, reflected radar, and light-detection and ranging
[lidar]). This complexity illustrates the magnitude and complexity
of the task for those who would evade detailed surveillance. Most
forms of deception work against one or two sensors -- smoke works
for some, radar-reflecting paint for others, quieting for yet
others -- but fooling overlapping and multivariate coverage is
considerably more difficult.
The task of assessing what individual sensor technologies will
have to offer over the next decade or so is relatively
straightforward; globally available technologies will come in many
types for use by all. The task of translating readings into
militarily useful data is more difficult and calls for analysis of
individual outputs, effective fusion of disparate readings, and,
ultimately, integration of them into seamless, cue-filter-pinpoint
systems. If the Army's demonstration facilities at Ft. Huachuca Note 18 are indicative, the United
States has done a good job of manually integrating sensor readings
in preparation for the next step -- which is automatic integration.
Automation removes the labor-intensive search of terrain through
soda straws and takes advantage of silicon's ability to double in
speed every two years. Automatic integration will depend, in part,
on the progress (always difficult to predict) of artificial
intelligence (AI).
Defensive IBW
Equally difficult to predict (or to recognize when they succeed)
are defenses developed to preserve invisibility or, at least, widen
the distance between image and reality on the battlefield. IBW
systems can be attacked in several ways. On one hand, an enemy
would be well advised to make great efforts against U.S. sensor
aircraft (such as AWACS or JSTARS). On the other, using sensors
that are too cheap to kill may be wiser (e.g., it is expensive to
throw a $10,000 missile against a $1,000 sensor). Sensors can also
be attacked by disabling the systems they use (e.g., hacker
warfare), and their systems can be overridden or corrupted (e.g.,
EW). Note 19
The most interesting defense, in relation to likely opponents
of the United States in the next ten or twenty years, would be to
use a variant of the traditional cover (concealment) and deception
with an admixture of stealth. Note
20 When sensor readings are technically accurate (that is, when
the readings reflect reality), countering IBW requires distorting
the links between what sensors read and what the sensor systems
conclude.
In high-density realms (e.g., urban areas, villages crowded
together, forests, mountains, jungles, and brown water)
counterstrategies may rely on the exploitation or multiplication of
the confusing clutter. Note 21 In
realms where the assets of daily civilian commercial life are
abundant, military assets would need to be chosen so they could be
confused with civilian assets (which tend to be more numerous and
less directly relevant to the war effort and so are not such
valuable targets -- contrary rules of engagement
notwithstanding).
Decoys, broadly defined, will probably be popular, on the
theory that hiding a tree in a forest may be more practical than
surrounding it with an obvious brick wall. The success of such
measures will vary with the architecture of the IBW systems they
are designed to fool. Systems based on multiple and overlapping
sectors are more difficult to elude than single-sensor
systems.
For the foreseeable future, battlefield sensors will not be
able to look at all information at the same time in sufficient
detail. Note 22 Thus, the sensor
system will need to use a combination of cuing, filtering, and
pinpointing (e.g., as a JSTARS system does to indicate a group of
moving vehicles so UAVs can be dispatched to identify each of
them). What sensors would be assigned which functions? Would
ambient sensors (e.g., acoustic, biochemical) be used to cue while
electro-optical ones pinpoint? Would IR readings be used for cuing,
neural with net devices as filters and ambient sensors as
discriminators? Which sensor readings would be discarded as least
reliable? How would the system compensate for areas of relatively
weak coverage?
An object may look like a duck, walk like a duck, but honk
like a goose; which is it? By carefully offering fowl for
examination by the other side and then noting which are classified
as ducks and which as geese, defenders may be yielded a clue to how
an observing system draws conclusions. Conversely, an observing
system observed may deliberately let ducks dressed as geese go free
to promote an illusion of its own inability to distinguish between
the them. This is an old technique in the game of intelligence: IBW
inserts the ethos, tendencies, and practices of intelligence Note 23 insistently into the
battlefield.
Information technology can be viewed as a valuable contributor
to the art of finding targets; it can also be viewed as merely a
second-best system to use when the primary target detection devices
-- a soldier up close -- are too scarce, expensive, and vulnerable
to be used this way. Open environments (tomorrow's free-fire zones)
aside, whether high-tech finders will necessarily always emerge
triumphant over low-tech hiders remains unclear.
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